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Replying to a paper by J. J. Valberg is a very special milestone for me. When 
I was his student (door, left; bookcase, right; desk-JV-window, front), I frequently 
resisted what he was teaching me, only to consequently back down when he 
explained where I had gone wrong. The only thing he never got me to back down 
over was my advocacy of physicalism – and it turned out I was wrong about that 
too! Given this history, my current prospects do not look rosy. But this time I have 
an advantage: because Valberg has underestimated the degree to which his 
philosophy has influenced me. If he had realised how much I have internalised his 
teachings over the years – particularly from Dream, Death, and the Self (Valberg 
2007), but also from everything else he has published or shown me – then I might 
have been in trouble. As it is, I think I will be OK. Seeing my position as viewed 
through Valberg’s eyes, as this paper allows me to do, makes me highly suspicious 
of that position as a matter of instinct. But even with this heightened critical 
awareness, I am not seeing anything wrong with it; my exposition was inadequate, 
I have no doubt, but that is all I am seeing. 
Central to Valberg’s own position is his distinction between the phenomenal 
and horizonal conceptions of consciousness. As he explains in his paper, we think 
about consciousness with the phenomenal conception when we think of an 
experience as ‘some kind of phenomenon (state or process or activity etc.) 
occurring in our heads or souls’ (p. 191). Thus when I think about my current 
experience as a distinctive ‘something’, then I am thinking about consciousness 
phenomenally; as if it were a phenomenon in the world, which I could designate 
like any other phenomenon. I may go on to hold that this ‘something’ is produced 
by my brain; or can be identified with something in my brain; or is an element of 
immaterial reality that interacts with my brain; or is an illusionary intentional 
object; or is one of the building-blocks of a reality which physical descriptions 
cannot adequately characterise. But in all such cases, the difference pertains only 
to my metaphysical theory of the nature of what I am phenomenally conceiving. 
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Valberg holds, as do I, that this is the conception routinely presupposed in 
philosophical debates about consciousness. The various sides all conceive of 
consciousness in this way, and then proceed to argue about the nature of what they 
are likewise conceiving; whether it is physical, non-physical, or illusory. 
Valberg also holds, as do I (being his follower in this regard), that we have 
another, radically different conception of consciousness which ‘remains in the 
background’ of these debates (p. 192). This is the horizonal conception, according 
to which consciousness is that within which things appear to us: the horizon of 
subjective presentation. Thus we may distinguish between a tree and the presence 
of the tree within my consciousness; if I fall unconscious, the tree will still be 
there, but it will no longer be experientially present to me. Consciousness, on this 
conception, is the first-person horizon, or context, from within which certain facts 
hold, such as that the tree is present to me. It is not a phenomenon we can point 
to, but rather the horizon in which the phenomena we can point to are present. In 
itself, the horizon is nothing, but objects and events appear within it (as opposed 
to: simply exist). And when objects and events permanently cease to appear within 
somebody’s horizon, their conscious life is replaced by the nothingness of death. 
Valberg thinks that the problem of consciousness, along with the standard 
responses to that problem – dualism, physicalist reductionism, eliminativism, etc. 
– arise from a failure to recognise the distinction between the phenomenal and 
horizonal conceptions. As he puts it, ‘the confusion consists in running together 
our conception of consciousness as something which occurs in our heads, hence 
as a phenomenon of some kind, with that of the horizon from within which the 
world is present to us’ (p. 192). Essentially, we presuppose the phenomenal 
conception, but also think about consciousness from our own, first-personal 
perspective – thereby employing the horizonal conception without becoming 
aware of it – to form a conception of a phenomenon whose existence depends on 
the first-person perspective we take on it: a curious, subjective kind of 
phenomenon which must somehow be integrated with the objective world. We are 
thus landed with the problem of consciousness, and inspired to propose a 
metaphysical theory to deal with it. The error which causes this problem to arise, 
as Valberg sees it, consists in mistaking the presence of phenomena within the 
horizon of consciousness, with the presence of puzzling subjective phenomena. 
And this occurs through neglect of the horizonal conception: we fail to adequately 
think through what it means to think about consciousness from the first-personal 
perspective. 
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Now I internalised all of this many years ago; but since I was not sure what 
to do with it, it remained compartmentalised within my thinking , just like the 
ideas of other philosophers who I could see were onto something, although I was 
not quite sure what – in this particular case, I was sure it was something important, 
however. I have never doubted the distinction between the phenomenal and 
horizonal conceptions; not since I first grasped it. The question for me was where 
to take it. And the Transcendent Hypothesis was the answer I eventually came up 
with. From Valberg’s paper, it is clear that he thinks I have neglected the 
distinction, made the standard mistake he diagnoses of presupposing the 
phenomenal conception, and simply come up with a new theory about the nature 
of the ‘problematic phenomenon’. That is not how I see it. 
As I see it, the Transcendent Hypothesis is a development of Valberg’s 
thinking about consciousness, which has the distinction between the phenomenal 
and horizonal conceptions at its heart. I was not in a position to simply agree with 
Valberg about consciousness, because there are certain aspects of where he takes 
his reflection on the phenomenal / horizonal distinction which I have never been 
able to accept; and not wanting to be what Lester Young called a ‘repeater pencil’, 
I would have avoided the topic of consciousness if I had thought Valberg had it 
entirely right. It is Valberg’s direction of travel after the phenomenal / horizonal 
distinction is made central to reflection on the nature of mind – as I agree that it 
should be – which has always been the problem for me. Trying to avoid the 
elements of his account which I could not accept was crucial to working out my 
own account. There are three of these. 
 
(1) Impossibilities 
 
Valberg thinks that the horizon of consciousness is a nothingness which is 
caused by activity in the brain. Since something physical cannot cause that which 
is nothing at all (nothing apart from what appears within in), he thinks this 
compels us to accept an impossibility as actual. This, he thinks, is the natural 
resting place of philosophical inquiry in this area; and he sees wisdom in just 
accepting and learning to live with it. It is just one of a number of impossibilities 
which Valberg thinks ordinary reflection ultimately leads us to, and which 
philosophy can do nothing more than make explicit to us. I respect this position, 
but my natural and unsophisticated reaction to it – which I am unable to see 
anything wrong with – is that if something is impossible, then it cannot happen; 
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so there must be something wrong with the reasoning that leads you to believe 
that it does happen. I think the task of philosophy is to answer certain kinds of 
natural curiosity, not to distil, clarify and intensify them, thereafter leaving us to 
acquiesce in their perfected forms. 
  
(2) The Phenomenal Conception 
 
Valberg thinks, and I agree, that there is a widespread neglect of the horizonal 
conception. But it seems to me that he makes the opposite mistake of neglecting 
the phenomenal conception; if we have two ways of thinking about consciousness, 
then both should be integral to, and reconciled within, our final account. For 
although Valberg grants the legitimacy of the phenomenal conception, it has no 
real place in his account. It serves primarily to provide his diagnosis of where 
others go wrong, and within his own account, it strikes me as merely an 
awkwardness. For on the one hand, Valberg thinks that the phenomenal 
conception, since it applies to phenomena, can only apply to the sole repository 
of phenomena: the objective world. Thus in his definitive exposition, he says: 
‘The point is not (of course) to deny that there are states, events, processes, etc., 
that occur or go on “in us” (in our brains and nervous systems) when we think, 
perceive, feel, will, and so on. It is not, in other words, to deny the validity of the 
phenomenal conception of mind’ (Valberg 2007: 99). And in an earlier treatment, 
he is clear that, ‘Like most philosophers these days, I believe that the idea of there 
being a soul (a spiritual substance) in us, and hence the idea that there are soul-
related phenomena (spiritual phenomena) occurring in us, is a fiction. The only 
phenomena occurring in us are, roughly speaking, biological phenomena’ 
(Valberg 1992: 145). More conclusively still, he goes on to say that, ‘there are no 
experiential phenomena, only experiential facts’ (ibid.: 146); that is, facts of 
presence within an experiential horizon. And yet on the other hand, Valberg grants 
that some of the phenomena that are present to us in the horizon of consciousness 
are merely ‘internal objects’ which are exhausted by their presence; such as 
hallucinations. Since these objects do not have independent existence in space and 
time, they are not part of ‘the world’ (Valberg 2007: 48-9).  
Now in his paper, he says that, ‘there is no denying that we at least sometimes 
conceive of consciousness (experience) in this [phenomenal] way. Thus, e.g., if 
you observe me looking at my hand, you might think that light rays reflected from 
my hand are striking my eyes and initiating a complex string of phenomena whose 
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upshot is yet another phenomenon occurring in me, viz., my visual experience or 
consciousness of my hand’ (p. 192). However, although philosophers standardly 
conceive the upshot of the causal process to be ‘yet another phenomenon 
occurring in me, viz., my visual experience or consciousness of my hand’, Valberg 
thinks this is an erroneous conception, of course – because there are no 
experiential phenomena. The only phenomena which the phenomenal conception 
of consciousness can legitimately be applied to are physical ones in the brain, the 
causal upshot of which is a horizon of consciousness. If Valberg himself were to 
accept the existence of experiential phenomena, against his own diagnosis of error, 
then the problem of consciousness would obviously arise in exactly the same way 
for him.  
However, it seems to me that Valberg already has this problem: because of 
his acceptance of internal objects, such as hallucinations. A hallucinatory object 
is an experiential phenomenon, and experiential phenomena have no obvious 
resting place in the objective world: hence the standard problem of consciousness. 
To deny that they exist within the objective world, and claim that they are 
exhausted by their presence within a horizon, does not tell us what they are; if 
they are phenomena, then like all phenomena, they must have a nature, and if this 
nature is not physical … herein we see the old problem re-emerging. Moreover, it 
seems to me that even without this problem – even if there were no internal objects 
for Valberg to deal with – his restriction of the phenomenal conception to physical 
phenomena, such as brain processing, would not be a phenomenal conception of 
consciousness; not unless he were to advocate the physicalist doctrine that brain 
events are identical to experiential events, which, wisely, he never would. For 
these physical phenomena, on his view, are simply what cause consciousness. 
They are not conscious phenomena themselves. I conclude that the phenomenal 
conception has no stable resting place within Valberg’s account. He is right to 
think it is legitimate, just as I do; but in that case it must be integrated with the 
horizonal conception within a unified account of consciousness. 
  
(3) Direct Realism 
 
Valberg advocates a sophisticated form of direct realism; it is the only account 
I know of which, from an experiential perspective, makes proper sense of the title. 
For if the objects of the world appear within the horizon of consciousness, we are 
directly aware of them; there are no experiential phenomena to mediate our access. 
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I have often suspected that the aim of making sense of direct realism motivates 
much of Valberg’s thinking (although I could be wrong about this.) I do not think 
it is a well-motivated aim; I rather think, following Rorty, that it derives from a 
history of attempts to find an iron-clad refutation of external world scepticism of 
the kind which cannot be, and has no need of being, refuted. Something along 
these lines, as I see it, is provided at a significant juncture in Dream, Death, and 
the Self (Valberg 2007: 111); Valberg’s twist is not to attempt to refute scepticism 
per se, but rather disarm it by showing that it is compatible with direct realism. 
But then, why should we want to be direct realists in the first place? The 
mainstream of twentieth-century philosophy has presupposed that this is a 
laudable aim; but that is not a good reason in itself. Valberg offers a simple 
phenomenological observation; that when we attend – honestly – to our 
experience, then all we find is the world, not experience itself (Valberg 1992: 
Chapter 2). This is to be distinguished from the familiar ‘transparency’ intuition, 
because Valberg is employing the horizonal conception; experience is not a 
transparent phenomenon (ibid: 150-1). But nevertheless, whether in its 
phenomenal or horizonal guise, the whole idea strikes me as thoroughly dubious. 
I often find myself travelling home by train at night, sitting next to the window. 
When you look out of the window in this situation, you can see the landscape 
passing by, but also a myriad of reflections from the inside of the carriage. What 
you see can be quite a mess, which it takes some thought to make any worldly 
sense of; I find myself not really sure what I am looking at and typically give up 
trying after a while. Now is it really obvious, in such a situation, that ‘All we find 
is the world’ (ibid.: 22)? Not to me. It seems considerably more plausible that I 
find a conscious experience which is the causal upshot of all kinds of things in the 
world; this strikes me as the prima facie situation, once philosophical reflection 
has begun, but which we can nevertheless easily overlook when viewing 
conditions are optimal, such as when we stand in front of a tree in broad daylight. 
And as I point out in Meaningless, many of the most prominent philosophers 
before the twentieth century found this patently obvious. What changed, I think, 
is that once science came to dominate our intellectual aspirations, the obviousness 
of this philosophical subject-matter of mediating experience – one which seemed 
to resist incorporation into the objective world which science can describe – came 
to seem like something that needed to be dismantled. Direct realism became the 
goal, and the most natural way to fit this into traditional philosophical concerns 
was to use it to refute the sceptic. But if the phenomenal conception of 
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consciousness is legitimate, as Valberg and I both agree that it is, then it seems to 
me that what we are conceiving must be experiential phenomena which mediate 
our access to the objective world. The task, as I see it, is to find a way to coherently 
fit this phenomenal conception in with the horizonal conception. And that is what 
I was trying to do with the Transcendent Hypothesis. 
 
My leading thought when arriving at the Transcendent Hypothesis – using 
Valberg’s manner of thinking about dream scepticism, but in light of my three 
sources of dissatisfaction with his final position, as detailed above – was that if 
this were a dream (me sitting at my desk; you reading these words in whatever 
your current situation is), then the dream objects I am experiencing must have 
some kind of reality or nature behind them. Since I take the phenomenal 
conception to be legitimate, the natural explanation of this is that my experiences 
of the dream objects are something real. Now in light of the horizonal conception, 
the reality possessed by the experiences could only be found in a context 
transcendent to the dream; one in which I am asleep in the objective world and 
dreaming all of this up (i.e. dreaming the situation in which I am typing at my 
desk). A model is thereby suggested of consciousness placing us within a horizon 
in which we find a world to be present (the dream world, in this case), with the 
reality of consciousness existing in a context which transcends the horizon (the 
objective world, in this case). Assuming that this is how consciousness always 
works, and that dream experience is not metaphysically special, I then formed the 
Transcendent Hypothesis, according to which the same happens in waking life. 
According to this theory, the reality of waking consciousness is transcendent: it 
transcends the horizon in which we find the objective world. (I have missed out 
various complicating factors for clarity of exposition, but they are all there in the 
book.) 
This account fully integrates the horizonal and phenomenal conceptions. The 
central insight to the horizonal conception, as I see it, is that is that consciousness 
places us within a horizon, with a world presented inside it, and the reality of the 
presentation outside it. But since I also take the phenomenal conception seriously, 
I think the presentations of an objective world which take place within our 
ordinary, waking horizon (as well as presentations of things that evidently do not 
belong to that world, such as hallucinations) are something: subjective 
experiences. Since these subjective experiences are found within the horizon of 
consciousness, then according to the Transcendent Hypothesis, their reality must 
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transcend that horizon. But since this is also true of the objective world which 
these subjective experiences indirectly inform us of, the reality of the objective 
world must also be found in a transcendent context; in the sense that it is the nature 
of transcendent reality which ensures the effectiveness of our interpretation of 
conscious experience in terms an objective world. So the reality of everything 
must be transcendent, to cut a long story short. We live in a transcendent reality 
which we make sense of with an ultimately incoherent mixture of subjective and 
objective thinking. 
On my view, nothing in the objective world causes or causally affects 
consciousness, so unlike Valberg, I am not required to accept impossibilities as 
facts. The objective world and horizon of consciousness are not an ontologically 
divided being and nothingness, as I see it, but rather two elements of the same 
representational package: a package we use to make the best sense we can of a 
reality whose true nature will always radically transcend human understanding. 
Objective conditions do seem to cause subjective, experiential ones, of course, but 
this is because we must represent subjective experiences as occupants of the 
objective world in order to apply our causal understanding to them, and thereby 
predict their comings and goings. Our representational package commits us to 
causally integrating experience with the objective world, but also provides the 
philosophical resources to see that this cannot really be what is going on; that we 
must be misrepresenting the transcendent reality, in order to think of it as different 
people having different outlooks on the same objective world. The 
representational package cannot be accurate as a whole, in the sense that it cannot 
capture the nature of the transcendent reality; which, in the final count, is all there 
is. But it is a package that works, such that outside of philosophy, we can say that 
the anaesthetic caused the pain to stop without any qualms whatsoever.  
You might sum up the difference between my account and Valberg’s as 
follows. On his account, we must recognise consciousness for the nothingness it 
is, and thereby learn to accept the impossible fact that nothingness is causally 
integrated with the objective world. On my account, we must recognise 
consciousness as a transcendent reality which we misrepresent in terms of 
subjective experiences, horizons and an objective world, and thereby learn to 
accept that its causal integration with the objective world is merely apparent. I do 
not think these two answers are so utterly dissimilar. On the contrary, I think the 
Transcendent Hypothesis is a Valbergian conception of consciousness, which 
makes some changes to the original in order to answer the question of what 
 203
consciousness is. (Valberg thinks this question is misconceived and I do not.) It 
seems to me a natural extension of Valberg’s account. 
With this in mind, let us turn to Valberg’s three objections to my theory of 
consciousness. They are all directed to an account according to which conscious 
experiences are phenomena that belong to a transcendent reality. Well, I do think 
that we conceive of conscious experiences as phenomena (because I accept the 
legitimacy of the phenomenal conception), and I also think that what we are 
conceiving of has transcendent reality. But here is the crucial point: I think 
everything that exists has transcendent reality. Valberg, I suspect, is thinking of 
the transcendent reality as another world; but I am thinking of it as our world. On 
my view, reality is transcendent; and there is only one reality. Since the 
independent nature of our world is transcendent, it is not something we can 
substantively describe. But we can and do substantively describe the one and only 
reality by misrepresenting it as experiential phenomena in causal dialogue with 
an objective world. We do not thereby capture its independent nature, but our 
descriptions work for all purposes apart from this metaphysical one. 
Valberg’s first objection is that it is implausible to hold that our commonplace 
beliefs about experiences causally interacting with objective conditions ‘are the 
result of a mistake’ (p. 190), namely that of misinterpreting transcendent 
conscious experiences. He asks, ‘why we should have the aim of interpreting 
consciousness as an indirect awareness etc. Or, if it not meant to be an “aim”, why 
suppose that we place such a convoluted and (no doubt) misguided construction 
on things when all we seem to be doing is – in our habitual inductivist way – 
ascribing a causal connection on the basis of an observed succession of 
phenomena (e.g., taking drugs and an alteration in the way objects look to us)?’ 
(p. 190). 
The first thing to say is that there is only any prospect of a mistake being 
involved if you are doing metaphysics. In all other walks of life, we will of course 
continue to talk about objective conditions causing and being caused by 
experiences. But if we want a metaphysical interpretation of what is going on, 
then mine will say that this involves misrepresentation; those offered by 
metaphysical realists who believe in causal transactions between objective 
conditions and experiences, will say the representation is accurate. Both are fully 
in accord with the manifest situation, namely that there seem to be such causal 
interactions (note that Valberg says ‘seem’ in this context too) – and non-
metaphysical talk can and will ignore these subtleties.  
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But then, why do I place this particular ‘construction’ on things? Because I 
take the phenomenal conception to be legitimate; unless you are an eliminativist, 
I cannot see how you can avoid this. As I made clear earlier when discussing 
Valberg’s treatment of the phenomenal conception, I do not think that even he has 
found any alternative; if brain states are the only things the phenomenal 
conception can apply to, as he has argued, then I think he actually is an 
eliminativist (in the phenomenal sense only). But if the phenomenal conception is 
legitimate – if experiences are among the phenomena we refer to – then since they 
cannot belong to the objective world, I cannot see how they actually can be in 
causal dialogue with the objective world. So given that we certainly do conceive 
of them as such, this must be a misrepresentation. Moreover, if experiences are 
phenomena, then since experiences perceptually inform us about the world, the 
natural thing to say – and what you will say, I think, so long as you are not 
determined to be a direct realist, for motivations I find highly dubious – is that 
this perceptual access is indirect. 
Valberg’s second objection is that, ‘in order for me to misinterpret C, that is, 
to take it to have properties it does (or could) not have, I would first have to single 
out C referentially. Yet if C belongs to a transcendent reality, this is not possible’ 
(p. 190). He goes on to say that, ‘If this were a dream, the reality that transcends 
the dream would be, for me, nothing more than “something” that exists or is there 
– “something” into which I might emerge. In that case, it is not clear how I might, 
in thought, single out for reference the entities – the objects and phenomena – that 
comprise the supposedly transcendent reality. They would not be entities about 
which I might form either a correct or an incorrect interpretation’ (pp. 190-1).  
My answer to this is simple: Valberg is right and so the theory he is criticising 
is wrong. But it is not my theory. He is thinking of individual experiences as things 
which belong to a transcendent reality, rather than objective reality; he is thinking 
of transcendent reality as another world. On my view, transcendent reality, 
conceived as such, is indeed ‘nothing more than “something” that exists or is there 
– “something” into which I might emerge’ (although I could only emerge into it 
if it is not the final context, given the horizonal structure of consciousness). We 
cannot pick out individual objects and events that carve transcendent reality at the 
joints, and certainly not when we refer to experiences, whose nature can be seen 
to be illusory within the horizon that contains the objective world. Nevertheless 
we can conceive of it in a manner which is not in accordance with its independent 
nature; we can conceive of transcendent reality as imminent reality. And this is 
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what we do with objective thought, and the shadow concepts we borrow from it 
in order to conceive of individual experiences. Our objective conception of reality, 
which gives us our conception of representation vs. misrepresentation (PML, 
Chapter 7), plus the phenomenal conception of experience, is what facilitates 
reference. Reference is thereby made to transcendent reality – because there is 
nothing else to refer to – but metaphysical reflection reveals that despite the utility 
to us of the referential distinctions we make in this way, they cannot be sensitive 
to the independent nature of this reality in the straightforward manner which 
metaphysical realism about the objective world supposes. Thus metaphysics must 
turn its back on objective thought when it comes to describe this independent 
nature, leaving it with a mere ‘something’. 
Reading between the lines, I get the distinct impression that Valberg thinks it 
is puzzling (to put it mildly) and rather odd (to go a little further), that I say there 
is a transcendent reality. Well here is a really straightforward way of looking at it. 
Whenever you want to say what reality really, truly is, you always have to point 
blindly outside the horizon to a mere ‘“something” into which I might emerge’, 
as Valberg puts it. That is why I say that reality is transcendent: it is transcendent 
to (outside of) the horizon. The objective world, by contrast, is within the horizon; 
it is within a representation of the true reality. Point inside and you get our 
representation; point outside and you get what we are representing. Since what 
we are representing is outside, we say that reality is transcendent. That sounds 
like a sensible enough position to me. 
Valberg’s third criticism (p. 191) is premised on the view that I think this (the 
here and now in which I am typing these words and take myself to be wide awake) 
is a dream; Valberg thinks this because he thinks believing that reality is 
transcendent, is equivalent to believing that waking life is a dream. Based on this 
premise, he says that out anyone who believes this is not a dream (i.e. normal / 
sane people), cannot accept my position that consciousness is transcendent 
without absurdly denying the existence of their own consciousness. The reason is 
that if they accept that consciousness is transcendent, while denying that there is 
a transcendent reality (as there cannot be if this is not a dream, according to 
Valberg’s reasoning), then they must deny the existence of all consciousness, 
including their own.  
This seems both right and unsurprising. If somebody thinks there is no 
transcendent reality, then they would hardly be attracted to the position that 
consciousness is transcendent; unless of course they had eliminativist ambitions.  
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But I think there is a transcendent reality (because I think reality is transcendent) 
and I do not have eliminativist ambitions. So the real question is surely: does 
believing that there is a transcendent reality, as I do, commit you to the view that 
this is a dream? Or we might just ask: do I think this is a dream?  
Well, there are eminent philosophers around who take the idea that this is a 
computer simulation designed by aliens very seriously. And there would be a 
certain panache involved in embracing the claim that this is a dream; of the kind 
currently in-vogue, as eliminative materialists try to subvert the anti-physicalist 
meme of zombies by proudly proclaiming: ‘I am a zombie’ (e.g. Garfield 2016: 
75). However I am afraid that I am not saying anything so radical and exciting, so 
no: I do not think this is a dream. I do not think I have ever seriously entertained 
the thought that this might really be a dream; not in the sense of not already being 
sure at the moment the issue arises, and consequently having to decide one way 
or the other. Moreover, I am certain that the position that this is a dream is not 
entailed by my theory. For if this is a dream, then the world which transcends it is 
the objective one. But according to my theory, the world that transcends what I 
call ‘waking life’ (the kind I am now engaged in), is not the objective world, but 
rather (in the final context) the independently existing reality, i.e. transcendent 
reality. Hence according to my theory, this is not a dream; the implication is 
squarely built into it. 
In the process of making this final objection, Valberg says that, ‘If (as I 
believe) this is not a dream, there is no transcendent reality’ (p. 191). But why 
not? Valberg thinks that from the perspective of a dream there is a transcendent 
reality; his whole philosophy is built around this idea. From the perspective of a 
dream, the transcendent reality is the objective world in which you are asleep in 
bed, dreaming. He thinks that the horizon of the dream can be displaced by the 
wider horizon of waking life. But given that we are conscious both in a dream and 
in waking life, and so must apply the horizonal conception of consciousness in 
both cases, why should the same not apply to the consciousness of waking life? 
Surely, once more, there must be a transcendent reality: the reality which is 
transcendent from the perspective of waking life. (Transcendence is a relative 
notion.) Otherwise, from the point of view of the horizonal conception, what is 
supposed to be ontologically grounding our waking consciousness? You could say 
‘nothing’: because consciousness is a nothingness. But in the dream case this was 
not Valberg’s answer. The answer was to be found in the objective world: 
somebody was dreaming and the physical reality of this caused their dream 
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experience. Well, it cannot be a matter of causation when we are talking about a 
reality that transcends the objective world. And once you get this far, you have 
more or less arrived at my Transcendent Hypothesis. I think I have followed 
Valberg’s principles through consistently, given that I wanted to go somewhere 
different with them. 
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